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Abstract
The United States (US)-led war in Afghanistan has resulted in high levels of civilian 
casualties and human suffering for over nine years. One of the primary causes of this 
suffering during the first three months of the war came from high altitude bombing led 
by the US Air Force. Tens of thousands of bombs equal to approximately 14,000 tons 
were used over Afghanistan in the first three months of the war from October 2001.* 
However the damaging effects of this bombing campaign were largely hidden from 
Western audiences. This article examines techniques used by the US government and 
two mainstream media organisations to alter perceptions of the early stages of the air war 
in order to dampen indignation over the injustice being perpetrated against Afghani-
stan’s civilian population. These techniques can be organised under five headings: cover-
up, devaluation, reinterpretation, the use of official channels and intimidation.
Keywords: injustice, backfire, Afghanistan.
Resumen
La guerra liderada por los EE.UU. en Afganistán ha producido unas elevadas cantidades 
de muertes civiles y sufrimiento humano durante más de nueve años. Entre las causas 
principales de este sufrimiento durante los tres primeros meses de la guerra estuvieron 
los bombardeos realizados desde gran altura por la Fuerza Aérea de los EE.UU. Decenas 
de miles de bombas, con un peso aproximado de 14000 toneladas, se lanzaron sobre 
Afganistán durante esos tres meses, a partir de octubre de 2001. Sin embargo, los efec-
tos destructivos de esa campaña de bombardeos se ocultaron, casi por completo, a la 
opinión pública occidental. Este artículo estudia las técnicas utilizadas por el gobierno 
norteamericano y dos populares grupos mediáticos para adulterar las percepciones sobre 
las primeras fases de la guerra aérea, con el objetivo de diluir la indignación que podría 
haber producido la injusticia sufrida por la población civil afgana. Estas técnicas pueden 
ser agrupadas en cinco categorías: ocultación, minimización, reinterpretación, uso de 
los canales oficiales e intimidación.
Palabras clave: injusticia, Afganistán, teoría de la acción contraproducente.*. M.W.Herold, ‘Urban Dimen-
sions of the Punishment of 
Afghanistan by U.S. Bombs’, in 
S.Graham (Ed.), Cities, War and 
Terrorism: Towards an Urban 
Geopolitics, Blackwell Publis-
hing, Malden, M.A., 2004: p.316.
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1. Introduction
Since 2001, Afghanistan has been occupied by US government-led forces as part of its 
ill-defined “war on terror”. Almost immediately following the September 11 attacks 
on New York and Washington, the US government accused the Afghanistan’s Taliban 
leaders of harbouring the Al-Qaeda terrorists allegedly  responsible for the attacks 
although little proof of this fact was offered at the time. What followed was an intensive 
bombing campaign in the lead-up to a full-scale invasion that had a destructive effect 
on Afghanistan’s civilian population. In the West, public outrage over the suffering of 
Afghani civilians was minimal.
Public outrage is a phenomenon that often occurs when an injustice is observed by a 
third party. History contains many documented examples of injustice but an aspect 
worth examining is how that injustice is communicated to a social or political group 
which at the time might be capable of mobilising against the perpetrator of the injustice. 
The repression of the communication of an injustice can have two outcomes. Firstly 
it prevents awareness of the unfair act and is therefore likely to reduce the chances of 
mobilisation against it. Secondly, it increases the possibility that the act can continue, 
or that similar cases can occur in the future without repercussions for the perpetrator.
In war, there is a strong likelihood of unjust crimes occurring. Rape, torture, the killing 
of civilians and genocide are examples of atrocities that are often committed in military 
conflict. Therefore when a country is at war the minimisation of public outrage becomes 
a primary concern, especially where there is the likelihood of crimes being committed 
against the innocent. The killing of civilians is especially important in modern times. In 
the First World War from 1914-1918 only 5% of deaths were civilian casualties1. In just 
over twenty years and with the advent of much larger and more technically advanced air 
forces, civilian casualties increased dramatically and during the Second World War over 
66% of casualties were civilians2. The allies were complicit in the deliberate targeting of 
civilians where over one quarter of American bombs during the war from 1941-1945 
were directed at commercial and residential areas of German cities3. This formed part 
of a two-pronged strategy to disable the urban industrial centres of military produc-
tion, and lower the German people’s “determination to fight”4. Now in the twenty first 
century, the proportion of civilian casualties in war has reached an astounding level of 
around 90%5. It is important then to examine the way in which a war’s effect on civil-
ian populations is communicated to larger audiences. If Western media audiences and 
constituencies were aware of the effects of war on civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan since 
the declaration of the “war on terror”, it is likely that opposition to these two theatres 
of war would be much greater.
The backfire model is one tool that can be used to analyse the way in which outrage has 
been minimised in war. The war in Indo China in the 1960s and 1970s produced case 
studies in civilian killing that have previously been analysed using this model. Tactics 
to reduce outrage over the mass bombing campaigns in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, 
the My Lai massacre and the Phoenix program have been documented previously by 
Brian Martin and Truda Gray6. A broader study of the initial invasion of Iraq was also 
undertaken by Martin to identify ways in which the US government attempted to 
prevent public outcry over the intervention when all pretexts for war were regarded as 
inadequate7. This paper adds to these existing backfire analyses by looking at the way 
1. J.Bourke, ‘Why does politics 
turn to violence?’, in J.Edkins 
and M.Zehfuss (Eds.), Global 




4. J. Friedrich, The Fire: The 
Bombing of Germany 1940-1945, 
Columbia University Press, New 
York, 2006: pp.53-54.
5. J.Bourke, p.373.
6. See T.Gray and B.Martin, ‘The 
American War in Indochina: 
Injustice and Outrage’, Revista 
de Paz y Conflictos, No. 1, 
2008: pp.6-28, and T.Gray and 
B. Martin, ‘ My Lai: the struggle 
over outrage’, Peace & Change, 
Vol. 33, No. 1, January 2008, pp. 
90-113.
7. B.Martin, ‘Iraq Attack Backfire’, 
Economic and Political Weekly, 
Vol. 39, No. 16, 17-23 April 2004, 
pp. 1577-1583.
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in which the media worked in conjunction with the US government to limit public 
outrage over Afghan civilian casualties at the beginning of the “war on terror”. The 
significance of identifying these tactics that occurred in 2001 is that similar tactics are 
being used today as the war moves into its tenth year. An understanding of these meth-
ods of reducing outrage gives observers and peace activists a system for understanding 
the apparent indifference in the West to the suffering of Afghan civilians and the war 
generally.
This article examines the way in which the US government and two mainstream media 
outlets employed tactics to limit or minimise outrage over the death and injury caused to 
the Afghan civilian population during the period of high altitude bombing from Octo-
ber 2001 to early 2002. The first section gives an overview of tactics used in backfire 
theory and the way in which these tactics function to inhibit outrage. This is followed 
by an account of the first three months of the air-war in Afghanistan by Professor Marc 
Herold in terms of civilian casualties. Herold’s data collection and analysis of the effects 
of the early stages of the bombing campaign is regarded as the most detailed study 
available for this period in Afghanistan. Following Herold’s account, an examination 
of selected articles from The New York Times and The Washington Post from early 2002 
demonstrates the extent to which these media outlets assisted in the minimisation of 
outrage over Afghan civilian casualties resulting from the US bombing campaign. These 
two news publications were selected because of their high circulation rates in the two 
major cities. Finally, the US government’s and US military’s direct role in the minimisa-
tion of outrage is described in terms of two of the five tactics outlined in backfire theory.
2. Tactics in backfire theory 
The backfire model is a useful instrument that can be used to analyse the tactics of 
the perpetrators of a perceived injustice. Its framework outlines five tactics that may 
be used to reduce outrage over the injustice and in doing so, minimise the possibility 
that the injustice will backfire on the perpetrator. The five tactics in the model can be 
summarised as cover-up, devaluation of the victims, reinterpretation of the event, the 
use of official channels and finally, bribery and/or intimidation. 
Cover-up concerns the way in which a perpetrator, or an organisation aligned with the 
perpetrator, will attempt to hide or conceal an injustice8. This is often the first tactic 
that will be used, although it should be emphasised that the tactics are not necessarily 
used in any sequential order. However if a cover-up is successful, then it is unlikely that 
any other tactics need to be employed. If a cover-up is unsuccessful or only moderately 
successful, then it is likely that another tactic will be employed to dampen outrage.
The devaluation of the victims of an unjust event is another tactic which may be used by 
a perpetrator to reduce outrage. In this instance the perpetrator or a supportive organisa-
tion will ostensibly justify the event by denouncing the victim. For example, if police 
were to shoot into an unarmed group of protestors, they might refer to the protestors 
as a violent rabble, regardless of their actions or levels of affluence. If the shooting were 
to be communicated to a receptive audience inclined to be outraged over the injustice, 
devaluing the victims is designed to have the effect of implying to the audience that 
the protestors somehow deserved to be shot, or perhaps their protest even represented 
a threat to the wider community. In Martin’s case study on the Rodney King beating 
8. B.Martin, Justice Ignited, 
Rowman and Littlefield, New 
York, 2007: pp. 5-6.
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in Los Angeles in 1991, the devaluation tactic was employed in a way that highlighted 
King’s past criminal (although non-violent) behaviour to imply that he in some way 
deserved the beating9.
Reinterpretation of the event is another way in which a perpetrator can reduce out-
rage. Reinterpretation comes in many forms and has become a political art in modern 
times with the use of “spin doctors” and public relations organisations to frame nar-
ratives in order to suit a particular agenda. The violent military interventions in Iraq 
and Afghanistan by the US, United Kingdom (UK), Australia and other nations have 
been re-interpreted as an exercise in homeland defence and formalised in the doctrine 
of pre-emption10. Again, this tactic is an attempt to draw attention away from the real 
injustice or organise perceptions of it in such a way that make it acceptable.
The use of official channels is a technique that can be used by the perpetrator(s) to 
give an impression that justice is being served. Government inquiries, international 
courts and other quasi judicial procedures can give the appearance of justice without 
having the power to apply retribution to the persons or organisations committing the 
injustice. The United Nations (UN) is one avenue that has been pursued in the “war 
on terror” as a means to justify the aggressive military intervention in Iraq. Although 
UN sanctioning was not forthcoming, there was an initial perception that the US was 
attempting to navigate a just pathway to war11.
Prosecuting a perpetrator of an injustice through official channels can be a slow process 
and the effects of the injustice can often have been maximised by the time a judicial 
hearing has taken place. The results of such trials and investigations can also be ques-
tionable. In the case of the initial investigation into the My Lai massacre during the US 
war in Indo-China, twelve US soldiers were prosecuted for the murder of Vietnamese 
civilians but only one was convicted. The single conviction resulted in a life sentence 
for the soldier, but he served only a short time in prison12.
The final tactic in the backfire model used to diminish outrage is intimidation and 
bribery. These could be described in some ways as a last resort, or alternatively as a first 
resort as a way of covering up an injustice. These tactics can be used against witnesses 
and any individual or organisation that may hold information about an injustice which 
could prove damaging to the perpetrator. Intimidation could mean violence or even 
death for those presenting a threat to the perpetrator, whereas bribery involves the use 
of financial incentives to achieve a similar result. If exposed these tactics would also be 
very damaging to the perpetrator in tandem with the unjust event itself and as a result 
such tactics are also covered-up giving the backfire model a circular dynamic although 
as previously stated, the five tactics do not necessarily occur in a sequential order.
This article examines the first three months of the air attacks by US-led forces in 
Afghanistan as a case study in backfire tactics. Two mainstream media organisations, The 
New York Times and The Washington Post, acted as de-facto agents for the US govern-
ment in performing the first three tactics: cover-up, devaluation and reinterpretation. 
The use of official channels and intimidation was conducted by the US government 
and US military.
9. Ibid. pp. 48-50.
10. A. Dawson and M. J. Schue-
ller, ‘Coda: Information Mastery 
and the Culture of Annihilation’, 
in A. Dawson and M. J. Schueller 
(eds.), Exceptional State: Con-
temporary US Culture and the 
New Imperialism, 2007, Duke 
University Press, London: p. 278.
11. Martin, 2004.
12. Gray and Martin, 2008a: p.18.













   






Riddick, B. The Bombing of Afghanistan: The Convergence of Media and Political Power to Reduce Outrage
3. The air assault on Afghanistan: October – December 2001
In less than one month after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in Sep-
tember 2001, the US government initiated an air war in Afghanistan. The large scale 
military effort was justified as an attempt to capture or punish the alleged perpetra-
tors of the September 11 attacks, Al-Qaeda, as well as removing Afghanistan’s Taliban 
leadership which was charged with supporting and assisting the actions of Al-Qaeda. 
This very swift response by the US government was activated without any international 
judicial procedures and the bombing of Afghanistan from October 2001 constituted an 
advanced military intervention against a weaker target that was comparable only with 
the bombing campaigns in Indochina in the 1960s and 1970s.
In December 2001, Professor Marc Herold of the University of New Hampshire pub-
lished the only detailed account of the effect of high altitude bombing on civilian infra-
structure and civilian life in Afghanistan between October 2001 and December 200113. 
His focus on Afghan civilian casualties is important because this cost was, and still is, 
largely ignored by the Western mainstream media. Herold’s methodology is consistent 
with an approach that is not prone to inflating figures, or deflating them. He gathered 
data from a range of independent news sources and some mainstream European and 
Asian news agencies, and provided first hand accounts from Afghani survivors that also 
appeared in these sources. Because of the difficulty in counting casualties in a war zone 
that is under heavy attack from the air, it is most likely that his figures are an under 
estimate. Herold’s work has been used by human rights and peace organisations, cited 
by numerous academics and gained wider exposure in publications such as The Guard-
ian and India’s bi-weekly national magazine, Frontline14.
An air bombardment of the scale that was launched by the US-led attack on Afghanistan 
causes civilian casualties in several ways. The first is that legitimate military targets may 
be hit, but those targets may be in close proximity to civilian infrastructure. Secondly, 
flawed military intelligence can lead to the incorrect targeting of civilian areas that are 
mistaken for military facilities. Thirdly, poor execution from those responsible for firing 
the weapons can lead to legitimate military targets being missed altogether. Another 
possibility is that the use of cluster bombs results in small unexploded bomblets being 
spread over a wide area. These bombs create problems for civilians during and after 
conflict in much the same way as land mines15. A significant problem in Afghanistan 
during the early stages of the bombing in 2001 was that one type of cluster bomb used 
by the US was the same colour as food parcels being dropped from the air16. Afghani 
civilians who were encouraged to collect the yellow food parcels were at risk of coming 
into contact with an unexploded bomblet.
The number of Afghani civilian casualties accounted for by Herold between Octo-
ber and December 2001 is in the thousands – up to 3,767 - a figure which has been 
described by Professor Achin Vanaik as “carefully conservative”17. Herold’s claim that 
a “heavy bombing onslaught must necessarily result in substantial numbers of civilian 
casualties simply by virtue of proximity to ‘military targets’” is reflected in the data 
presented in his article18. Herold counters the “dangerous notion” that the United States 
can wage an air war and only kill enemy combatants and despite claims that new tech-
nology enables US weapons to primarily hit military targets, the bombing campaign 
was aimed extensively at civilian facilities19. The extensive use of cluster bombs early in 
13. M.W. Herold, 2001, ‘A 
dossier on Civilian Victims of 
United States’ Aerial Bombing of 
Afghanistan: A Comprehensive 
Accounting [revised]’. 
14. See M.W. Herold, ‘Counting 
the Dead’, The Guardian, 8 
August, 2002, M.W.Herold, ‘The 
Massacre at Kakarak’, Frontline, 
Vol.19, Iss.16, August 3-16, 2002, 
S.Shalom, ‘Far from Infinite 
Justice: Just War Theory and 
Operation Enduring Freedom’, 
Arizona Journal of International 
and Comparative Law, Vol.26 
No.3, 2009: pp.623-697, and  
Revolutionary Association of the 
Women of Afghanistan – http://
www.rawa.org/temp/runews/
category/marc_herold. 
15. M.W. Herold, ‘Steel Rain: 
An Analysis of Cluster Bomb 
Use by the U.S. in Four Recent 
Campaigns’, 16 June, 2003.
16. Human Rights Watch, 
‘Cluster Bombs in Afghanistan’, 
October 2001.
17. A.Vanaik, ‘The Ethics and 
Efficacy of Political Terrorism’, 
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the campaign resulted in the deployment of over 248,000 bomblets in Afghanistan by 
US warplanes between October 2001 and March 200220. Cluster bombs are by their 
very nature indiscriminate anti-personnel weapons and no doubt contributed to the 
civilian death toll during this bombing campaign. 
As well as direct casualties from the US bombing, it is likely that many indirect casualties 
occurred for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the widespread “carpet bombing” employed by 
the US air force destroyed roads and utility supplies such as power and water21. When 
these services are cut off, public institutions such as hospitals are unable to operate 
creating a twofold impact on the people affected by the bombing. For those who have 
survived the actual bombing but are in need of urgent medical attention as a result of 
their injuries, a significant problem arises when the medical system has been rendered 
inoperable by damage caused to the power supply, water supply, and road services sup-
plying medical equipment. These indirect casualties do not form part of Herold’s figure 
of 3,767 casualties which supports the notion that his data represents an underestima-
tion of civilian casualties arising from the bombing campaign. The roll-on effect of 
having a society’s infrastructure extensively damaged means that even for survivors, the 
chances of living in any degree of acceptable comfort is severely diminished. Consider-
ing that the civilian population of Afghanistan had no connection with the September 
11 attacks in New York and Washington, the US military intervention in Afghanistan 
could readily be viewed as unjust.
4. Afghan civilian casualties and mainstream news reporting: cover 
up, reinterpretation and devaluation
Following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the news reporting on 
the event could be accurately described as saturation coverage. In the first four weeks 
after the September 11 attacks, for the three main US news broadcasters, ABC, CBS 
and NBC, their top three stories were related to the attacks themselves, the new ‘war on 
terror’, and the proposed strike against the Taliban22. The top ten stories in the weeks 
from September 11 to the launching of the air war against Afghanistan related to the 
attacks in some way23. Using the Proquest Newsstand database, a keyword search using 
the criteria “victim” and “terrorist” in the date range from 11 September 2001 to 11 
October 2001 results in 142 articles in The Washington Post and The New York Times 
Late Edition alone. The mass media was justifiably concerned with the human impact 
of the September 11 attacks which resulted in the deaths of nearly 3,000 civilians.
In response to the September 11 attacks, the sustained air attack on Afghanistan led by 
the US military also resulted in a significant number of civilian casualties. As document-
ed by Herold, by December 2001 the number of civilian casualties in Afghanistan had 
exceeded those caused by the attacks on Washington and New York. However outrage 
was minimal over Afghan civilian casualties compared to the outrage over the deaths 
of US civilians on September 11. One explanation for this involves the use of specific 
tactics designed to minimise outrage. In general terms, reducing outrage over perceived 
injustices is an important consideration for governments so that support for policies 
associated with the injustice is not diminished on a national and international level.
Most news reports of the bombing didn’t mention civilian casualties that came about 
as a result of it, preferring to focus on the high-tech weaponry per se, rather than the 
20. Human Rights Watch, Vol.14, 
No.7, December 2002, ‘Fatally 
Flawed: Cluster Bombs and 
their use by the United States in 
Afghanistan’, p.1.
21. Herold, 2001.
22. A. Eisman, ‘The media of 
manipulation: patriotism and 
propaganda – mainstream 
news in the United States in the 
weeks following September 11’, 
Critical Quarterly, Vol.45, Issue 
1-2, Spring 2003: p.56.
23. Ibid.













   






Riddick, B. The Bombing of Afghanistan: The Convergence of Media and Political Power to Reduce Outrage
damage caused by the weapons. In a war such as this where tens of thousands of bombs 
have been used in a short period of time, the effects of the bombing arguably should 
be a significant part of the story of the war. Where the mass media omits this side of 
the story it can be considered a de facto cover-up. According to Neil Hickey, the editor 
of Columbia Journalism Review, the bloodless coverage conformed to the Pentagon’s 
determination to eliminate images and descriptions of civilian bombing casualties which 
would no doubt have eroded public support for the war in the US and other parts of 
the world24. 
A few articles in two of North America’s most prestigious newspapers did mention 
civilian casualties however, these stories used other techniques to minimise outrage. I 
have chosen a total of five articles from The New York Times and The Washington Post to 
illustrate these techniques. The articles were selected on the basis that they specifically 
address the problem of civilian casualties during the first six months of the air war 
which corresponds with a three month period studied in greater detail by Herold. The 
consistent pattern in The New York Times and The Washington Post articles show that 
the mainstream media outlets are willing to acknowledge civilian casualties, although 
greatly underestimating the extent of the harm inflicted upon the civilian population 
when compared with Herold’s more thorough and detailed account.
According to The New York Times, the first detailed assessments of the US air war in 
Afghanistan became available in early April where reports claimed that of the 22,000 
bombs and missiles which were dropped on Afghanistan, 75% hit their targets25. This 
means that approximately 5,500 bombs missed their targets, legitimate or otherwise, 
and potentially impacted on non-military targets. It is reasonable to suggest that this is 
an extraordinarily high number over a six month period in terms of the risk it poses to 
the civilian population of Afghanistan. Despite this, the US Defence Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld is quoted in a New York Times article on 9 April describing “this war the most 
accurate ever”26.
Although the stated aim of the air campaign was to “topple the Taliban government and 
destroy Al-Qaeda operations in Afghanistan”, New York Times journalist Eric Schmitt 
concedes that there is no definitive measure to assess the effectiveness of an air campaign, 
describing attempts to do so “as much an art, as it is science”27. Although Schmitt quotes 
Rumsfeld’s statement about accuracy without critical comment, the “art versus science” 
argument contradicts Rumsfeld’s position. If a war is claimed to be highly accurate, 
then this accuracy should be measured using scientific methods, rather than “artistic” 
techniques. The claim that the air war in Afghanistan is “accurate” implies a minimisa-
tion of suffering for the civilian population, a claim that is inadvertently negated by 
using the “art versus science” accounting method. 
Although Schmitt is prepared to acknowledge a 25% failure rate of US bombs to hit 
their intended targets, he fails to raise any possibility that the “errant” bombs had the 
potential to negatively impact upon Afghanistan’s civilian population, deferring instead 
to Rumsfeld’s claims of military accuracy. Interpreting this article through a backfire 
lens, Schmitt’s article contains elements of cover-up and reinterpretation. The failure 
to even speculate that civilian casualties might arise from the sheer number of bombs 
used and the 25% failure rate to hit intended targets indicates a cover-up, where the 
omission of obvious facts serves to hide a considerable aspect of the bombing campaign. 
24. N.Hickey, ‘Access denied: 
Pentagon’s war reporting rules 
are toughest ever’, Columbia 
Journalism Review, Jan/Feb, 
2002: p.27.
25. E. Schmitt, ‘Improved US 
Accuracy Claimed in Afghan 
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Schmitt’s uncritical restatement of Rumsfeld’s claim to accuracy demonstrates a rein-
terpretation of events that not only defies common sense, but also the data on civilian 
casualties collected by Herold.
In July 2002, Dexter Filkins wrote in The New York Times that the American air cam-
paign “had produced a pattern of mistakes that killed hundreds of Afghan civilians”28. 
Filkins’ analysis though is based only on eleven bombing incidents in Afghanistan and 
is not a universal estimate. Herold’s analysis of the same eleven incidents estimates 
a slightly higher figure than Filkins29. However if we return to Schmitt’s article that 
documents thousands of bomb deployments, Filkins’ analysis and figures are a misrep-
resentation of Afghan civilian casualties overall. When one considers that the location of 
military targets in Afghanistan were in urban areas as a result of the Soviet era legacy,30 
it could be expected that even those bombs that successfully hit military targets would 
likely have caused considerate civilian damage. Filkins’ news article is consistent with 
Herold’s claim that one of the main tasks for the corporate media is to downplay claims 
of “civilian casualties caused by US bombs”31.  Filkins repeats questionable claims from 
U.S. commanders that they “painstakingly assess the potential for injuring civilians 
or damaging civilian facilities” and that this is “the most accurate war ever fought in 
this nation’s history”32. The reader is then left wondering how this “accuracy” might 
be assessed because US commanders concede “that they have not kept track of civilian 
deaths in Afghanistan”33. Taking into account that over 20,000 bombs were dropped on 
Afghanistan in six months, it is understandable that the US military would be unable 
to collect adequate data which accurately represented the extent of the damage that had 
been inflicted on Afghan civilians. Whilst this article is an improvement on Schmitt’s in 
that it does acknowledge some level of civilian casualties, in terms of reducing outrage, 
it also is an example of reinterpretation where the extent of civilian casualties has been 
minimised by publishing a low estimate from a small number of case studies.
The theme of “low civilian casualties” was continued in The New York Times in an article 
by Thom Shanker where Rumsfeld was quoted as saying that he took some comfort 
in the knowledge that civilian losses in this war had been fewer than any in modern 
history34. The abstract use of a timeframe such as “modern history” makes it difficult 
to determine exactly which other wars Rumsfeld was comparing with the intervention 
in Afghanistan. Perhaps his statement should have read that the number of ‘reported’ 
civilian deaths in the mainstream media was fewer than any in modern history. Further 
in Shanker’s article Rumsfeld goes on to say that the numbers of casualties that the 
US had been able to find, “or anyone else had been able to find”, were fewer than first 
reported35. This claim is partially explained in Schmitt’s article which described the way 
in which US Air Planners had designed bomb detonators with adjusted timing devices 
in relation to the construction of Afghan buildings36. The aim of these devices was to 
achieve “maximum damage” on existing Afghan buildings, which would justify Rums-
feld’s claim that casualties had been difficult to find. For example if a bomb destroys a 
building where say, one hundred people work, killing all, it is quite likely that less than 
one hundred bodies would be recovered due to the “maximum damage” design of the 
weapon. In this example although reported casualties might be high, it is likely that 
the number of bodies found are far fewer. The statement from Rumsfeld that reported 
casualties were higher than bodies accounted for implies that the initial reports were 
28. D. Filkins, ‘Flaws in US Air 
War Left Hundreds of Civilians 




31. M.W. Herold ‘Truth about 
Afghan Civilian Casualties 
Comes Only through American 
Lenses for the U.S. Corpora-
te Media [our modern-day 
Didymus],’ in Peter Phillips 
and Project Censored (eds.), 
Censored 2003: the Year’s Top 25 
Stories, Seven Seas Publishing, 
New York, 2002: p.282.
32. Filkins, 2002.
33. Filkins, 2002.
34. T. Shanker, ‘Rumsfeld Calls 
Civilian Deaths Relatively Low’, 
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inflated. This is an example of the tactic of reinterpretation, where creative accounting 
methods for civilian casualties create an impression that the numbers are low. 
During this time in 2002, The Washington Post also reinterpreted civilian casualties in 
Afghanistan, referring to reports of “hundreds” of civilians killed in air attacks around 
major battle zones37. Rumsfeld is quoted uncritically in this article claiming that he 
cannot “imagine there’s been a conflict in history where there has been less collateral 
damage, less untended consequences”38. The author, Pulitzer Prize winning journalist 
Karen De Young, has since stated in a 2004 Washington Post article that as journalists, 
“we are inevitably the mouthpiece for whatever administration is in power”39. Further 
examples of this type of media behaviour are demonstrated in the article where De 
Young states unequivocally that Taliban reports of civilian casualties were “exaggerations 
with little basis in fact”40. Interestingly De Young does refer to Herold’s count of civilian 
casualties, but allocates only one sentence to his study. The main emphasis in this 1200 
word article is on the “dozens” and “hundreds” of civilians that have been killed as a 
result of US air strikes. With respect to civilian casualties, the pattern of reinterpretation 
present in The New York Times is also evident in this article. 
De Young’s article also contains elements of devaluation where casualties are system-
atically referred to as being connected with either Al-Qaeda or the Taliban. The first 
example in this article concerns an attack described by De Young that occurred near 
the mountain caves of Tora Bora where the Pentagon claimed that “innocent victims 
were Al-Qaeda relatives or civilians knowingly sheltering terrorists”41. Proof of this 
relationship between the victims and the terrorist organisation is not offered and could 
be dismissed as speculative if attention is paid to De Young’s general commentary on 
civilian casualties where she asserts that “there is little opportunity to check claims of 
civilian deaths on the ground” and that “assurances that no mistake has been made gen-
erally rely on technical observation from the air”42. It could be concluded checking the 
victims’ association with Al-Qaeda would also be difficult from the air. The effect of this 
unproven association is to devalue the victims who, because of an unsubstantiated link 
with Al-Qaeda, could be viewed by De Young’s readers as being less worthy of concern.
In February 2002 a Washington Post article by Molly Moore conceded that precision 
guided missiles in Afghanistan “almost always hit their targets, but sometimes have 
killed the wrong people”43. In this article the tactic of devaluation operates in a way that 
reduces civilian casualties to “Taliban claims” of civilian casualties. Moore states that 
the Taliban placed the numbers of civilian casualties in the thousands but “anecdotal 
evidence” suggests the figures are much lower44. There is no suggestion from Moore as 
to what value this anecdotal evidence might be but the effect once again is to limit the 
audience’s perception of the scale of civilian suffering as a result of the US bombing 
campaign. By quoting civilian casualties in terms of a Taliban claim, the implication is 
that the claim is unreliable. The anecdotal evidence supplied in The New York Times by 
Schmitt, that 5,000 US bombs missed their target, indicates that the Taliban estimates, 
supported by Herold’s data, are reasonable.
37. K. De Young, ‘More Bombing 
Casualties Alleged; UN Aide 
‘Concerned’; Rumsfeld Defends 
Airstrike Targeting’, The Wash-
ington Post, 4 January, 2002.
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39. J.Winter, Lies the Media Tell 
Us, Black Rose Books, Montreal, 
2007: p. 219.
40. K. De Young, 2002..
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. M. Moore, ‘Fleeing US 
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Say’, The Washington Post, 13 
February, 2002.
44. Ibid.













   






Riddick, B. The Bombing of Afghanistan: The Convergence of Media and Political Power to Reduce Outrage
5. Official channels: The UN, ISAF and NATO
There are no strong examples or evidence of the US government using official channels 
as a way of minimising outrage through giving the appearance of justice during the early 
months of the air campaign in Afghanistan. The United Nations did not sanction the 
intervention which began in October 2001, and there appeared to be little effort made 
by the US government to use official channels in any way to legitimise the interven-
tion before the bombing began. However, some connection with official channels has 
occurred since. In December 2001, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
was created as a UN mandated force to assist the newly created Afghan Transitional 
Authority45. Whilst it is not known what influence the US government had in creating 
this force, its international composition and link with the UN has the effect of giv-
ing legitimacy to the US attacks. Since 2003, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) assumed control of the ISAF and the fighting force in Afghanistan is referred 
to as a NATO force. Conducting the war in Afghanistan under the NATO flag gives the 
impression that the intervention is legitimised by the support of a large multi-national 
force despite the fact that the initial action was a unilateral one taken by the US gov-
ernment. The current troop contributions from 44 of the 47 contributing nations are 
minimal with over 75% of soldiers being supplied by three countries: the US, UK and 
Australia46, indicating that the multinational force is significantly influenced by the 
interests of a few.
6. Intimidation: Silencing Al-Jazeera
One way in which the US government and military attempted to minimise outrage over 
the war in Afghanistan was by attacking the Arab news agency Al-Jazeera. Free of the 
controls of US government propaganda and broadcasting mainly to an Arab audience 
but with content freely available on the internet, Al-Jazeera showed “intensely terrifying 
scenes of war”, broadcasting uncensored images of the human suffering in Afghanistan 
and Iraq47. When the war in Afghanistan began, US Secretary of State Colin Powell 
used his influence to exert pressure on Qatar to “rein in” Al-Jazeera’s reporting of the 
war48. When this approach was not as successful as hoped, Al-Jazeera’s Kabul office was 
targeted and hit by US missiles49. Al-Jazeera posed a genuine threat to the US govern-
ment’s desire to shield the American public, as well as Al-Jazeera’s primary audience 
in the Middle East, from witnessing the human suffering in Afghanistan. The attack 
on Al-Jazeera’s office is an attempt to prevent the communication of this suffering and 
shows the way in which methods of intimidation are linked to cover-up.
It should also be noted that it is not just foreign journalists or those associated with 
Al-Jazeera that have been the targets of intimidation by the US military in Afghanistan. 
US journalist Doug Struck was detained at gun point by US soldiers when he attempted 
to investigate the scene of a missile attack that was said to have killed a number of civil-
ians50. The soldiers held Struck for over twenty minutes and when he asked them what 
would happen if he proceeded to the bomb site without their permission they replied 
that he “would be shot”51. Again this is an example of intimidation by the US military 
to restrict the outflow of information about the effects of the war.
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7. Conclusion
The bombing of Afghanistan immediately after the September 11 attacks on New 
York and Washington resulted in the deaths of a significant number of innocent civil-
ians not accounted for in the sample articles taken from The New York Times and The 
Washington Post. Each newspaper acted as a de-facto agent for cover-up, reinterpreta-
tion and devaluation. The formation of the ISAF under NATO control following the 
initial US bombing campaign shows the way in which official channels have been used 
since the initial attacks to legitimise an aggressive military action by a very powerful 
nation against a far weaker state. The silencing of Al-Jazeera and the threatening of 
Doug Struck illustrates the way in which intimidation can also be used to prevent the 
communication of unjust events reaching a receptive audience.
The backfire model predicts that following an injustice, the perpetrator will use some or 
all of these tactics to minimise outrage, a term that is interchangeable with indignation, 
anger or any other emotion that may cause a person or organisation to react against the 
injustice. The model contains another element not discussed in this article and that is 
where these five tactics are unsuccessful in inhibiting outrage, the injustice will backfire 
on the perpetrator. How this might occur in the case of Afghanistan is difficult to say 
but one option for peace activists is the use of counter-tactics.
If we were to consider counter-tactics in the backfire model using this case study, an 
area for continued study concerns the way in which other means of communicating 
the effects of the Afghan war on civilians can promote outrage. The inverse of cover-up, 
reinterpretation and devaluation is to expose the action, interpret the events accurately, 
and place value on the lives of the victims and the victims’ families. The emergence 
of the whistle blowing website Wikileaks in recent times offers this possibility. In July 
2010, Wikileaks released 92,000 classified Pentagon documents on the war in Afghani-
stan between 2004 and 2009. Wikileaks’ spokesperson Julian Assange claims that the 
documents do not reveal a “single mass killing” or crimes that could be attributed to a 
single individual, but an ongoing story of the “continuing deaths of civilians, children 
and soldiers”52.
One of the interesting points about the release of these documents and Assange’s desire 
to reveal what he describes as the “true nature of the war”, is that the mainstream media 
has paid little attention to the documents’ content and more to the story associated with 
Assange and his organisation. The tactics used by Assange to promote outrage have been 
countered again by a range of actors using tactics that also fit within the backfire model. 
Following the release of the Afghanistan documents there were numerous calls from 
the mainstream media to have the Wikileaks site shut down.53 Closing the Wikileaks 
site could be viewed as another cover-up. Assange found himself at the centre of rape 
allegations in Sweden where charges were laid, then dropped, then re-opened. 54 The 
effect of this international publicity is to devalue Assange using a “trial by media” tech-
nique. Finally, the claim that the documents will endanger the lives of Afghan civilians 
working with the US military as informants is an ironic twist in reinterpretation when 
the purpose of the document release was to show the scale of damage already done to 
the civilian population following the US occupation.55 This last claim may be true but 
what is genuinely lacking in the media discourse surrounding Wikileaks is an analysis 
of the documents in terms of the civilian deaths that have occurred since 2001. The 
52. J.Adetunji, ‘Wikileaks founder 
Julian Assange: more revela-
tions to come’, The Guardian.
co.uk, 26 July, 2010.
53. D.McCullagh, ‘Growing calls 
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Zdnet, 3 August, 2010.
54. No Author, ‘Sweden reopens 
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Guardian, 2 September 2010, 
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55. J.Birmingham, ‘The Man 
Who Fell to Earth’, The Monthly, 
October 2010, pp.20-27.
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release of the documents by Wikileaks has not led to a questioning of the war, but an 
attack on the organisation which is trying to raise awareness of the broader injustices 
of the war. What this indicates is that in the battle over outrage, Western governments 
supported by a compliant mainstream media make a formidable opponent.
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